Equity

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IS DISINHERITENCE BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION LEGAL?

August 19, 2011 in Challenging the Validity of Wills, Claims Against Estate: Summary Procedure, Dependant Support Claims, Equity, Estate Litigation, Public Policy & Estates, Variation of Trusts, Wills by Charles Wagner

Will a Canadian court vary or set aside a will when a parent disinherits a gay/lesbian child because of his/her sexual orientation?  The law may be different depending on the province.

In Canada, the law balances the idea of testamentary independence against public policy concerns.  While cherishing testamentary freedom, the law intervenes when it finds provisions in the will offensive to public policy and or equity.  In Ontario, this restriction on testamentary freedom has been expressed by laws passed to protect spouses (under Part I of the Family Law Act [FN1]) and dependents (under Parts II and V of the Succession Law Reform Act [FN2]). 

Two true stories from British Columbia:  In both Patterson v. Lauritsen [FN3] and Peden v. Peden Estate [FN4], a parent disinherited or reduced the inheritance of a child because the parent did not approve of the child’s homosexuality.  The Court in each of these cases held that, in today’s society, homosexuality is not a factor that would justify a judicious parent disinheriting or limiting benefits to a child. 

Would the same thing happen in Ontario?  Maybe – maybe not.  In the British Columbia cases, even though the parents had capacity and were not subject to undue influence, their wills were open to challenge on the ground that the parents had disinherited their children without, what the court considered to be, reasonable cause. While the Ontario Court of Appeal has stated that the “moral considerations” underpinning the British Columbia approach apply in Ontario, to my knowledge, there has been no case to date where an Ontario Court has varied a will to benefit a non-dependent disinherited adult child [FN5].  In Ontario, except where a will offends public policy, it is still open to debate whether a capable parent, acting voluntarily, is entitled to disinherit a child - however whimsical, mean-spirited, or controlling such action may seem. 

A comment made by an Ontario judge in 1995 is of interest insofar as it suggests where an Ontario court may draw the line.  In Fox v. Fox Estate [FN6], a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, the father named his wife the executrix under his will.  The income was to be used for the grandchildren with the capital for the son.  The will also gave the mother an unfettered discretion to encroach on the capital of the estate for the benefit of her son’s children. She took all the capital, eliminating her son’s inheritance because he was involved with a non-Jew.  The judge commented, “….in response to a query from the bench, counsel in this case were not prepared to argue that any court would today uphold a condition in a will which provides that a beneficiary is to be disinherited if he or she marries outside of a particular religious faith”. The Court viewed the mother’s behaviour as being mala fides and contrary to public policy.

Testators that ignore the changing winds of public policy do so at their own peril.  In M v. H, [FN7] the Supreme Court of Canada compelled Ontario to change the definition of “spouse” as set out in the support provisions of the Family Law Act. Prior to that case, common-law heterosexual couples were included in the definition of spouse, but gay and lesbian couples were not. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that, for the purposes of support under the Family Law Act, a spouse includes “…either of two persons …”. The court ruled that limiting the definition of “spouse” to heterosexual couples, for the purposes of support, was discriminatory and not justifiable.  In Canada today same-sex marriages are legal.  It is therefore entirely possible that an Ontario court would set aside a provision in a will that disinherited someone because of his/her sexual orientation, on the grounds that such disinheritance offended public policy.

 This short review of the case law should not be taken as legal advice. Based on my experience in dealing with these cases, they often turn on the specific facts. If you have a legal question relating to something similar, you are best advised to seek out competent legal counsel to determine your best course of action.

Charles B. Wagner is a partner at Wagner Sidlofsky LLP. This Toronto office is a boutique litigation law firm whose practice is focused on estate, commercial and tax litigation.   The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michelle Kotzer in the preparation of this article.

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FN1.  Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3

FN 2.  Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26

FN3.   Patterson v Lauritsen (1984) CarswellBC 381, 58 BCLOR 182, [1984] 6 WWR 329, 17 ETR 316.  Available on line at Patterson v. Lauritsen, 1984 CanLII 353 (BC SC)

FN4.   Peden v Peden Estate (2006) CarswellBC 2801, 2006 BCSC 1713, [2007] WDFL 1837.  Available on line at Peden v. Peden, Smith et al., 2006 BCSC 1713 (CanLII)

FN5.   See Justice Cullity’s 1998 decision of  Banton v. Banton, 1998 CanLII 14926 (ON SC) and in particular paragraph  36  where he states, “It is hardly necessary to say that the principle of freedom of testamentary disposition is in the background to the issues relating to the validity of the wills of December 21, 1994 and May 4, 1995. If George Banton had capacity and was not subject to undue influence at the time of the execution of one of those wills, its validity and effect are not open to challenge on the ground that he thereby disinherited his children. In this jurisdiction, unlike others in Canada and elsewhere, unless the children are dependants, a capable parent acting voluntarily, is entitled to do this however mean and ungrateful it may seem, or how selfish the motive; hence the focus in this case, as in so many others, on testamentary capacity and undue influence.”

Compare this with the decision of the Court of appeal in Cummings v. Cummings CanLII 9339 (ON CA).  At paragraph 40,  Blair J. A. states, “[40]         In my view these questions have been resolved by the decision of   the Supreme Court of  Canada in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate 1994 CanLII 51 (S.C.C.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807.  There, the Court  held that a deceased’s moral duty towards his or her dependants is a relevant consideration on a dependants’ relief application, and that judges are not limited to conducting a needs-based economic analysis in determining what disposition to make.  In doing so, it rejected the argument that the “judicious father and husband” test should be replaced with a needs-based analysis: see para. 23.  I see no reason why the principles of  Tataryn should not apply equally in Ontario, even though they were enunciated in the context of   the British Columbia Wills Variation Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 435, in which the language is somewhat different from that of  the Succession Law Reform Act.

I also recommend  the reader to see  Susan J. Woodley’s paper entitled “The (Almost, Possible, Probable) Right of an Adult Child to Receive Support”, presented at the Ontario Bar Association 2009 Institute of Continuing Legal Education.

FN6.    Fox v. Fox Estate 1996 CanLII 779 (ON C.A.), (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 496, 10 E.T.R. (2d) 229 (C.A.),

FN7. M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. I refer the reader to an aritlce written by Mary C. Hurly entitled “Sexual Orientation and Legal Rights”. The article appears on the Parliament of Canada Website and can be found at Sexual Orientation and Legal Rights (PRB 08-49E) . When considering the impact of the decision and how it reflects on public policy in Canada her conclusion speaks to how a court may view the public policy issue. “Judicial and legislative reforms, particularly since the M. v. H. decision in 1999, have effected a significant shift in Canadian society with respect to recognition of the legal status and claims of same-sex conjugal couples. The watershed nature of this shift is illustrated, most notably, by federal legislation sanctioning same-sex marriage.

Opponents of these reforms continue to argue that the extension of same-sex rights in general, and same-sex marriage in particular, undermine the traditional family and family values. At the same time, some gay and lesbian couples (like some heterosexual couples) do not want either the legal obligations or the benefits that flow from spousal status or marriage. As the 2002 report of the former Law Commission of Canada and other indicators suggest, the question of whether the matter of entitlements based on the marital or conjugal nature of a partnership should be re-examined remains open.”

Unjust Enrichment, Equity and your Mother in Law

August 3, 2011 in Applications for the Opinion and Direction of the Court, constructive trust, Dependant Support Claims, Equity, Estate Litigation, Unjust Enrichment, Constructive Trust and Quantum Meruit Claims in Estates, Wills by Charles Wagner | 2 comments

The average person goes to a lawyer because they just feel they were treated unfairly.  I read a case recently and thought long and hard about how the plaintiff, Mary Simonin, must have felt.  Her lawyer could not go to court and just say Mary was treated inappropriately.  We lawyers must apply the facts to legal doctrines and theories.  We rely on older cases to show that in similar circumstances the courts have granted damages to our clients.   So let’s go through the facts of this case, see why Mary felt she was treated unjustly, and look how the courts applied the law to her situation.

Mary, her husband Franco and their children lived on a farm owned by Mary’s mother in law.  They paid no rent.  Franco ran a construction company and used that company to renovate his mother’s farm.  He never charged his mother a penny for what amounted to over $200,000.00 worth of work. Instead, for between 30% and 50% of the cost of the improvements Franco billed his company’s other clients.

Franco died.  Six months later Mary and her children left the farm.  The mother sold the farm for $880,000 and gave $200,000 to her daughter.  Mary and her children got nothing.  Does that sound unfair to you?  It did to Mary.  Were Franco’s children also not entitled?  Didn’t Franco add value to the Property?  Were his children not entitled to the benefit of their father’s work?  The matter went to trial and was appealed (FN1).  One can surely understand how Mary felt cheated.  Let’s see how the courts dealt with her complaint in the legal context.

Mary’s lawyer argued that Franco’s estate had a quantum meruit claim for unjust enrichment(FN2).  Essentially, this Latin phrase describes a legal doctrine standing for the proposition that a person should be compensated for services or goods provided even if there was no legally enforceable contract.  Based on seminal cases such as Peter v. Beblow, 1993 CanLII 126 (S.C.C.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980 and Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 Mary’s lawyer argued that she should be compensated because Franco’s mother was enriched by virtue of the work done by Franco, that Franco suffered a corresponding deprivation for what he could have charged her and there was no juristic (legal) reason for Franco’s mother to get that work done for free.  The other side disagreed. 

While the trial judge and Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that Franco’s mother was enriched they did not believe that he suffered a corresponding deprivation.  In other words – he did not lose anything.  Firstly – it was his company not Franco that did the work.  Secondly the company was paid for the work already, albeit by other customers.  How could Franco have been deprived of compensation for his work if he was already paid for it by his other customers?    Finally – when addressing the third part of this test, that being the absence of a juristic reason for Franco’s mother to retain the benefit, the court pointed out that it was just and fair that the mother keep the benefits without paying for it.  After all, Franco and Mary lived on the property rent free.  They benefited from the renovations and most importantly they never indicated to Franco’s mother that there was any expectation at all of compensation for Franco’s work.

 Before leaving this case I want to address an interesting side point.  Ordinarily, a plaintiff cannot come to court seeking an equitable remedy & compensation for unjust enrichment, if she does not come to court with clean hands.  Even though Franco charged his clients for the work done on his mother’s farm the court did not hold that against Mary.  Why?  Because while improper, those actions were not immediately and necessarily related to the claim (FN3).

 This short review of the case law should not be taken as legal advice. Based on my experience in dealing with these cases, they often turn on the specific facts. If you have a legal question relating to something similar, you are best advised to seek out competent legal counsel to determine your best course of action.

 Charles B. Wagner is a partner at Wagner Sidlofsky LLP. This Toronto office is a boutique litigation law firm whose practice is focused on estate, commercial and tax litigation

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FN 1.    The Court of Appeal Decision is accessible on line at Simonin v. Simonin, 2010 ONCA 900 (CanLII) — 2010-12-24 and the trial decision can also be found on line at Simonin v. Simonin, 2008 CanLII 58155 (ON SC).

FN 2.   On our firm’s website I have provided a case scenario and some of the seminal cases dealing with the doctrine of unjust enrichment.  This might assist the reader in dealing with this issue and I refer you to this link http://www.wagnersidlofsky.com/quantum-meruit-claim.php

FN 3.  See paragraphs 56 -62 of the trial decision at Simonin v. Simonin, 2008 CanLII 58155 (ON SC).  As Daley J. stated at paragraph 62 “ As such, while the manner in which the renovation costs were paid for through Spancrest may have been improper, it is not immediately and necessarily related to the plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment.  In the result, I conclude that that arrangement does not bar the plaintiff from making the claim for a remedy based on alleged unjust enrichment.”

Are Promises Enforceable?

June 10, 2011 in Applications for the Opinion and Direction of the Court, constructive trust, Elder Law, Equity, Estate Litigation, Unjust Enrichment, Constructive Trust and Quantum Meruit Claims in Estates, Wills by Charles Wagner

Lora and Jeffrey started living together.  As their 23 month relationship grew stronger Jeffrey promised Lora that when he died Lora would get his RRSPs worth about $1,750,000 as long as they were still living together.  Jeffrey insisted that Lora sign a cohabitation agreement before he would keep his promise.  Before the agreement was signed Jeffrey died.  Was Jeffrey’s promise legally enforceable?  At trial Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (FN1) decided that Lora would get the money.  Jeffrey’s estate appealed.

Lora sued the estate on a number of different grounds.  I would like to focus on one which the Ontario Court of Appeal (FN2) addressed – was Jeffrey’s promise legally enforceable under the doctrine known proprietary estoppel? Let’s start by defining some terms. 

Let’s assume Jeffrey made a promise to Lora. Proprietary estoppel is a legal doctrine which prevents Jeffrey from enforcing his legal rights with respect to property once he made a promise or representation not to do so.  This is applied if Lora relied on the representation/promise and would suffer if Jeffrey or his estate enforced his legal rights.  The court would force Jeffrey or his estate to keep the promise if it would be palpably unfair to allow him to strictly enforce his legal rights.  Proprietary estoppel is an example where courts will look to equitable doctrines to address unconscionable wrongs.

Sometimes courts will use equitable remedies, like proprietary estoppel, to address a situation where the application of strict legal rights would be unfair.  Under these circumstances the court may ignore a contract or a testamentary document and provide the plaintiff with a remedy.  By applying equitable principals courts will sometimes enforce promises.

The Ontario Court of Appeal in Schwark Estate v. Cutting(FN3) reviewed a number of causes of action and remedies through which a promise may be enforced.  In the course of that analysis the Court of Appeal summarized the essential elements of proprietary estoppel as follows:

  1.  the owner of land induces, encourages or allows the claimant to believe that he has or will enjoy some right or benefit over the owner’s property;
  2. in reliance upon this belief, the claimant acts to his detriment to the knowledge of owner of the land; and
  3. the owner then seeks to take unconscionable advantage of claimant by denying him the right or benefit which he expected to receive.

So what does proprietary estoppel have to do with Lora and Jeffrey’s situation in the Belvedere v. Brittain Estate?  Lora’s lawyers raised a number of equitable arguments (FN4) which the court dismissed.  The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed those arguments finding that Jeffrey’s estate was not unjustly enriched by Lora’s contributions and accordingly the trial judged erred in applying the doctrine of constructive trust.  At that point the court considered the alternative remedy of proprietary estoppel.

The first issue addressed by the Court was whether this doctrine of enforcing promises relating to land could be used to enforce promises relating to RRSPs.  The Ontario Court of Appeal noted that there is some controversy on this point, but it proceeded with the analysis on the assumption that it did apply. (FN5).  A key issue in enforcing such a promise is that Lora had to rely on it to her detriment.  Seeing that she did not rely on the promise and suffer any loss the court dismissed the proprietary estoppel argument.

So does that mean that promises are not legally enforceable?  Maybe.  The Ontario Court of Appeal decision makes room for such an argument if it meets the criteria set out in  Schwark Estate v. Cutting.   In an article published in the Estate and Trusts Quarterly, Ian Hull, a leading estate litigator stated (FN6), “While the doctrine of proprietary estoppel has deep roots in the British courts, the recent developments in the context of estates seem to point to a new and effective remedy available to claimants in the context of estate litigation”.

This short review of the case law should not be taken as legal advice. Based on my experience in dealing with these cases, they often turn on the specific facts. If you have a legal question relating to something similar, you are best advised to seek out competent legal counsel to determine your best course of action.

 Charles B. Wagner is a partner at Wagner Sidlofsky LLP. This Toronto office is a boutique litigation law firm whose practice is focused on estate, commercial and tax litigation

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FN1.  Belvedere v. Brittain Estate  2007 CanLII 32666 (ON S.C.), (2007), 45 R.F.L. (6th) 81. Justice E.R. Browne of the Superior Court declared that Ms Lora Belvedere was entitled to a constructive trust in Mr. Brittain RRSPs at the time of his death, to be satisfied by payment to Ms. Belvedere of $1,750,000.

FN2.   Belvedere v. Brittain Estate, 94 O.R. (3d) 655 (2009) OCA .  To access the case on line see  bit.ly/Belvedere/Brittain

FN3.  Schwark Estate v. Cutting, 2010 ONCA 61.  To access the case on line see http://bit.ly/Schwark

FN4.  Lora’s lawyers argued that the estate of Mr. Brittain was unjustly enriched and that the trial judge was correct in finding a constructive trust on $1,750,000 of the estate assets in favour of Lora.  Alternatively, Lora’s lawyers argued that the trial judge  should have considered the remedies of a “resulting trust” and or “proprietary estoppel”. 

FN5.  See paragraph 67 of  Belvedere v. Brittain Estate, 94 O.R. (3d) 655 (2009) OCA.  To access the case on line see bit.ly/Belvedere/Brittain

FN6.  Ian Hull and Suzana Popovic-Montag’s article “Proprietary Estoppel — An Innovative Claim Against the Assets of an Estate can be found in the Estate and Trust Reports, 3rd series 2009.  The cite is 55 E.T.R. (3d) 44.

Resulting Trusts, Clean Hands and Who Gets the Cottage

January 16, 2011 in Applications for the Opinion and Direction of the Court, Claims Against Estate: Summary Procedure, Equity, Estate Litigation, Evidence in Estate Litigation, Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Constructive Trust and Quantum Meruit Claims in Estates, Wills by Charles Wagner | 1 comment

Albert was always a bully and Dad loved him best.  Judy became a successful doctor and, in part to get away from her dysfunctional family, she moved to Montreal.  When Dad died, Judy was happy to see that her father left his $1,000,000.00 estate equally to both his children.  But, Albert had other ideas.

Albert went to court and claimed that 20 years ago he bought a cottage which was now in their father’s name.  That cottage, now worth 400,000.00, was transferred to Dad 20 years ago because Albert was being investigated by the Canada Revenue Agency for failing to pay taxes for five years.  Albert feared that the Canada Revenue Agency would take the cottage away so he transferred the property to his father for $50,000.00 except Dad never paid Albert a dime.  Albert claimed that his father had held the cottage in a resulting trust for him and it now had to be transferred back to Albert.  With the evidence presented there could be no doubt that Albert paid for the cottage, maintained the property and that the father participated in the scheme to protect the asset from the Canada Revenue Agency. 

In our fictional scenario Albert could argue that in Ontario there is a legal presumption that people make bargains and not gifts.  Accordingly, if Albert paid for everything the court should presume that he has a beneficial interest in the cottage.  This is the basis of his resulting trust(FN1) claim.

Judy might argue that even if Albert’s story was true he still does not deserve to get the cottage when the whole thing was based on a scheme by Albert to cheat Revenue Canada.  As Professor Waters stated in his text Waters’ law of Trusts in Canada, “The basic principle is that a person may not have the assistance of equity if the person does not come with clean hands”.(FN2).   Arguably,  if Albert tried to cheat on his taxes he did not have clean hands and should not benefit from the equitable remedy of a resulting trust.  How could it be fair for Albert to have it both ways?  To the Canada Revenue Agency Albert said the cottage belonged to Dad and now to Judy he is saying it belonged to him.  Given his intention to cheat Canada Revenue Agency does Albert deserve the benefit of an equitable remedy? 

In Holland v Holland (FN3) Justice Reilly of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice faced a similar question.  A husband transferred a cottage into his wife’s name in exchange for $15,000.00.  No money changed hands and the whole thing was a plan to avoid having an asset that would be seized for unpaid taxes.  When the couple split up the husband claimed to have a beneficial interest in the cottage. This is an excerpt of the judge’s decision “…a declaration of resulting trust is an equitable remedy. In order to obtain such remedy, the applicant must approach the court with clean hands.  In this case, Mr. Holland did not do so. ….It is for Mr. Holland to persuade the court that he is entitled to an equitable remedy and I conclude he has failed to do so.”

Would this reasoning in a family law dispute apply to an estate litigation matter?  Maybe.  Having dealt with these types of cases I can only repeat that these are very complicated matters and some courts have taken the view that despite the improper intention, if no one was in fact defrauded (for example, if it turned out that Albert never really owed Canada Revenue any money) then he might get the cottage back.

This short review of the case law should not be taken as legal advice. Based on my experience in dealing with these cases, they often turn on the specific facts. If you have a legal question relating to something similar, you are best advised to seek out competent legal counsel to determine your best course of action.

Charles B. Wagner is a partner at Wagner Sidlofsky LLP. This Toronto office is a boutique litigation law firm whose practice is focussed on estate, commercial and tax litigation.

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FN1. There is a difference between a resulting trust and a constructive trust. A constructive trust has nothing to do with the intention of the parties. It is a flexible tool used by the courts to redirect funds or property which has been wrongly taken. It is an equitable remedy used by the courts to address an unjust enrichment. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at p. Defines a resulting trust as an equitable trust that arises whenever one party buys property and has it gratuitously conveyed to another or into the joint names of himself and another.”:

FN2. See Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 3rd Ed. 9 — Revocation: Setting the Trust Aside
9.II — Setting the Trust Aside B. Fraud by Settlor.

FN3. Holland v. Holland 2007 CarswellOnt 7195, [2008] W.D.F.L. 49, 49 R.F.L. (6th) 97, 161 A.C.W.S. (3d) 767. Justice Reilly’s decision considered a number of cases involving a transfer of property where the intent was to defeat creditors. Most persuasive was His Honour’s quote of Lord Denning in Tinker v. Tinker, [1970], 1 All E.R. 540 at 542:
“… I am quite clear that the husband cannot have it both ways. So he is on the horns of a dilemma. He cannot say that the house is his own and, at one and the same time say that it is his wife’s. As against his wife, he wants to say that it belongs to him. As against his creditors, that it belongs to her. That simply will not do. Either it was conveyed to her for her own use absolutely; or it was conveyed to her as trustee for her husband. It must be one or the other. The presumption is that it was conveyed to her for her own use; and he does not rebut that presumption by saying that he only did it to defeat his creditors. I think that it belongs to her.”